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I. Introduction 
 
 
Condemned by the World Trade Organization and governments across the 
world, ‘dumping’ in international trade has become an ever-expanding subject of 
debate by economists and policymakers, alike.  Widely considered to be an anti-
competitive practice, product dumping is a form of monopolistic price 
discrimination, which arises as a result of discriminable domestic and export 
markets.  Standard equilibrium theory holds that, in the context of international 
trade, perceived differences in the elasticities of demand in these two markets will 
enable a producer to price discriminate its product between domestic and 
international markets.  Dumping is a special analog of this, and is defined as an 
instance in imperfectly competition, where the elasticity of demand for the 
international market exceeds that of its domestic counterpart, thereby enabling a 
producer to sell its product more cheaply abroad than it does in its own domestic 
market.  Despite being a natural product of free trade, dumping has been frowned 
upon by regulators who state that it amounts to nothing more than an anti-
competitive trade practice. 
Since the first documented cases of product dumping in the late 
eighteenth-century, which involved British exporters ‘dumping’ goods in the 
United States, policymakers have decried its existence.  Since the first anti-
dumping legislation was enacted in Canada in 1904, an innumerable number of 
international agreements have emerged, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement [6].  The 
purpose of these agreements has generally been to define a legal definition of 
what product dumping is, as well as a uniform set of antidumping policies.  These 
antidumping policies, which generally take shape in the form of tariffs and other 
prohibitive barriers, are frequently the subject of rather contentious debate.  A 
significant reason for this contention can be attributed to the varying cardinalities 
of ‘dumping’, and the convoluted economic justifications for policing each of 
them.  Regardless of the justifications that have been propounded, economists 
tend to agree that antidumping legislation is as unnecessarily costly as it is 
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prohibitive to free trade.  Indeed, there are very few circumstances in which anti-
dumping legislation is by any means justified [2].  Even then, such situations are 
as implausible as they are rare.  Take for example the case of what is known as 
“predatory dumping”.  Widely considered to be the most egregious form of 
dumping, predatory dumping is the international analog to domestic predatory 
pricing, as it is a firm’s intention to deliberately sell its product at sub-competitive 
prices in an attempt to drive the domestic producers out of the market. 
Nevertheless, despite being found in fewer than 5% of all alleged dumping 
charges in the United States, predatory dumping continues to be a central 
justification for the continued existence of antidumping policies [2].   
Indeed, given the rarity of these most egregious dumping practices the 
economic justifications for antidumping policies become even more untenable.  
However, proponents of such policies contend that dumping practices result in a 
loss of profits for the domestic industry of the importing nation [2].  While there 
are undeniably instances in which this can occur, their existence is difficult to 
define, and are based almost exclusively off of a “fair price” metric, which seek to 
estimate a foreign firm’s production costs [2].  Like the antidumping policies that 
spawned their creation, these “fair price” metrics are themselves rather untenable, 
as they generally do not account for the nature of the markets in which this price 
discrimination is occurring.  This methodology is fundamentally flawed since it is 
in fact market dynamics, and not price alone, that determines whether or not 
dumping, in the economic sense of the word, can occur in a given market.  This 
flaw is not surprising, for it arises at the precise point where the legal and 
economic definitions of product dumping diverge.   While both the legal and 
economic definitions of dumping reach the same end, an exporter selling its 
product for a lower price in its export market than in its home market, the 
economic definition is fundamentally concerned with why such behavior arises in 
the first place. 
Astoundingly high levels of trade liberalization and deregulation in the last 
thirty years have exposed trade and industrial organization theory to a plethora of 
new markets for which the possibility of product dumping must now be 
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considered.  As a result, considerable attention has been given to product dumping 
in international trade literature in recent decades, especially in light of China’s 
growing economic integration, whose manufacturers are often the source of the 
growing number of dumping complaints and violations in the United States.  Prior 
to China’s entry into the WTO, and its export boom in the latter half of this 
decade- which has seen export growth rates as high as twenty-five percent per 
annum- dumping allegations made against China were confined to a relatively 
small set of industries [3].  However, throughout China’s export boom of this 
decade, which has seen its share of the world market more than double in size, the 
number of documented cases of dumping by Chinese manufacturers has seen a 
more than proportional increase, in an even wider array of industries [3].  A prime 
example of these dumping violations takes shape in the form of the Chinese off-
road tire industry, whose manufacturers were recently fined, in the form of duties, 
by the United States Department of Commerce for price distortion.  The U.S. 
Department of Commerce estimates that Chinese tire producers and exporters 
were selling their products in the U.S. at rates of 10.98 to 210.48 percent less than 
their fair-market value [6].  In light of this increase in the number of industries in 
which product dumping has been alleged, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, it is 
only natural to investigate how product dumping arises under varying market 
structures.  
One of the first forays into extending the generalized case of product 
dumping was achieved by Brander and Krugman [1], who extend the product 
dumping literature to consider a symmetric duopolistic environment in which 
elasticity of demand perceptions give rise to intra-industry trade.  According to 
these authors, such trade will result in a phenomenon known as ‘reciprocal 
dumping’ if both firms perceive that the elasticity of demand in their export 
markets is higher than that which they realize in their home market.  This is a 
rather parsimonious conclusion, which can be generalized to nearly any intra-
industry trade scenario.  In turn, this begs the question, how can this framework 
be characterized when we weaken the assumptions made by Brander and 
Krugman?  The objective of this paper is accordingly to characterize several trade 
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equilibriums in this duopolistic setting while weakening the symmetry 
assumptions set forth in Brander and Krugman [1].  To achieve this, we will 
evaluate their proposed model in the context of both a static equilibrium and 
sequential game setting.  In the sequential game setting, we will show how 
government regulation of intra-industry trade can positively affect the welfare of 
the nations involved through a form of information coordination.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 1 characterizes a reciprocal 
product dumping environment in the presence of asymmetric cost functions across 
firms which experience different economies of scale.  Chapter 2 extends the 
reciprocal dumping scenario characterized in Brander and Krugman [1], but in the 
context of a finite sequential game where the information set held by both firms is 
asymmetric.  Chapter 2 is followed by a brief conclusion and appendix, which 
contains the pertinent derivations used in Chapters 1 and 2.    
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Chapter I 
The Brander-Krugman Framework, Revisited 
 
 
I. The Basic Model Under Cost Asymmetry  
 
 
Using Brander and Krugman [1] as a basic framework, we begin by 
assuming the existence of two countries and two markets, defined as ‘domestic’ 
and ‘foreign’ respectively.  The firms and markets of these two countries are 
identical, and firms are assumed to be able to export their products to one 
another’s markets, freely.  In this context, trade is said to be ‘free’ when products 
may be sold abroad, free from any outside intervention or restrictive policy (e.g. 
tariffs and quotas).  Although trade is assumed to be free, firms incur transport 
costs in exporting their products abroad. 
To consider the case of intra-industry dumping, as Brander and Krugman 
[1] do, we will restrict our scope to consider only the market in each country for 
one commodity, which is defined as .  Let  be a homogenous commodity; that 
is, units of  are assumed to be identical regardless of what firm produces them.  
In each country, we assume that there is only one producer of  , which 
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correspondingly exhibit oligopolistic behavior as a result of our assumption of 
open economies.  The lynchpin of this duopolistic market structure is the Cournot 
perception held by each firm.  That is, both firms believe that the other’s level of 
output is fixed in each market, until proven otherwise.  As a result, both of these 
firms select their profit-maximizing levels of output subject to their implicit 
assumption that the other firm is holding its output fixed. 
Where the Brander and Krugman [1] model relies on the symmetry of the 
domestic and foreign firms’ cost structures, we relax this assumption, considering 
instead the feasibility of reciprocal dumping in the case of asymmetric cost 
functions.  To establish this asymmetry, we first consider the case of the domestic 
firm, which we assume to exhibit decreasing economies of scale.   
The domestic firm, which produces ‘x’ units of Z for domestic 
consumption and ‘x*’ units of  for foreign consumption, exhibits a quadratic 
total cost function, and thus an increasing marginal cost for both domestic and 
foreign units. A key implication of the domestic firm’s increasing cost-function is 
that its output functions for each market are implicitly a function of one another. 
As explained, both the domestic and foreign firms are exposed to 
transportation costs associated with their exports.  This cost follows directly from 
Brander and Krugman [1], which can be likened to the ‘iceberg’ costs first 
proposed in the Stopler-Samuelson Theorem.  Essentially, this cost assumes that 
some proportion of exports is ‘destroyed’ during the export process, which we 
define as: 
 
(1)  ,   0,1 
 
 It is important to point out that because  is bounded between 0 and 1, the 
transportation cost functions as a multiplier, which is in keeping with the idea of 
‘iceberg’ transport costs.  For example, when   0.9, the transport cost of each 
unit of  Z is 1.1, suggesting that 10% of the exported products are ‘destroyed’ in 
the process of export 
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Combining this cost of export with the quadratic cost function for Z, and 
using * to denote the quantity produced for the foreign market, the domestic 
firm’s total cost function may be represented: 
 
(2)            ⁄    
  
 
Analogous to the domestic firm, the foreign firm produces outputs ‘y’ and 
‘y*’ of  for the domestic and foreign consumption, respectively.  The foreign 
firm is assumed to experience constant returns to scale, and thus a constant 
marginal cost, c.  This is a convenient assumption, which enables the foreign firm 
to select its profit-maximizing level of output for each market independently of 
one another.  This set of assumptions about the foreign firm’s cost function may 
be expressed mathematically as: 
 
(3)            ⁄    
 
It is important to underscore that the solution set of this new model is 
independent of our cost assumptions for each firm. That is, which firm 
experiences an increasing cost function (e.g. domestic or foreign) will not affect 
our analysis.  However, unlike Brander and Krugman [1], the asymmetry of this 
characterization necessitates the uniqueness of the solution sets in each market.  
As a result, we need to define and solve for the optimal solutions in each of the 
two markets, as the market shares of each firm will differ for both of the two 
markets.   
 
 
II. The Optimal Levels of Output   
 
 
In order to identify the trade equilibrium, we must first define the profit 
functions that are to be maximized. We begin by defining the total revenue 
functions of both firms.  Since we are assuming that both firms are able to trade 
freely with one another, the total revenue functions incorporate revenue from both 
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the domestic and foreign markets.  To arrive at the profit function of each firm, 
we simply subtract each firm’s total cost function from their total revenue 
function.  Mathematically, we can express this function for the domestic and 
foreign firm, respectively, as: 
 
(4)                 ⁄    
 
 
(5)                ⁄    
 
 
Using the notation set forth in defining the total cost functions for both the 
domestic and foreign, asterisks are used to denote variables associated with the 
foreign country.  In addition, we use the variable ‘F’, to define all fixed costs 
associated with production.  Again, the dependent nature of the domestic firm’s 
quadratic cost structure, along with the cost structure asymmetry of the two firms, 
reveals the necessity of considering each country’s solution set.  
The first solution set that we will consider is the simpler case of the 
domestic market.  Derivations for the solution set for the foreign firm are 
annotated with the letter (A) next to the equation number. With each firm 
maximizing with respect to their domestic market output, the following first-order 
conditions are found: 
 
(6)        !  1   2   2  0 
 
(6A)       !   /  0 
 
 
We similarly compute the first-order conditions in the foreign market: 
 
 
(7)       !   2  – 1 ⁄    0 
 
(7A)        !  1      0 
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Within both (4) and (5), we use the variable ! to represent the exporting 
firm’s market share in the given market, and similarly use   to denote the point 
elasticity of demand in the domestic market.   
We derive the point elasticity of demand and foreign market share 
variables from the firms’ Total Revenue functions mechanically through the 
simple inclusion of a multiplicative %&'%&' term.
1
   The justification for utilizing 
this term is that it enables us to interpret the marginal revenue function more 
easily by expressing them in terms of the point elasticity of demand and the 
exporting firm’s market share. This is purely a mechanical nuance, which merely 
serves to make the trade equilibrium more comprehendible, and has no effect on 
our marginal revenue solutions.  
Because the first-order conditions necessitate the optimization of the total 
profit function, the equations listed in (4) and (5) may be economically interpreted 
as best-response functions in their implicit form.  It is each firm’s adoption of the 
so-called “Cournot perception” that enables the first-order conditions to function 
in such a capacity, as each firm assumes that the other is holding their output 
fixed.   Rearranging, and using ( to denote the total level of output in each market, 
these best-response functions, we arrive at the following: 
 
(8)  (   %&%
)
) & *+  
 
(8A) (   ,)) + * 
 
(9) (   
% & %& -.)
) + *  
 
(9A) (   ,)) & *+ 
 
Rewritten, each of these equations is now an explicit best-response 
function for the domestic and foreign firms.  In this particular instance, they 
                                                           
1
 The mathematical derivation of this term is illustrated in the appendix. 
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denote each firm’s profit-maximizing level of output for a given price in each 
market.  An important point to underscore from these solutions is the dependence 
of (6) and (7) on one another, which prevents us from being able to solve 
explicitly for the optimal quantities of output for either firm.  As a result, though 
we are able to generalize the trade equilibrium values, we will not be able to 
develop generalized, explicit solutions for them.  Rather, these solutions will 
depend on the assumptions we make about the demand function in each market.   
The reason for this is due to the quadratic cost function that we assume for the 
domestic firm, which prevents it from selecting its domestic quantity independent 
of its export quantity.  Although we are unable to solve for explicit generalized 
trade equilibrium for all possible demand functions, we are able to do so for linear 
demand functions.  An example of how this is possible is discussed in the 
Appendix.  
While it is unfortunate that we cannot generalize the trade equilibrium 
across all the set of all possible demand functions, we can still nevertheless derive 
the implicit trade levels by solving for the size of the exporting firm’s market 
share in each market, which is denoted by !.  Solving for !, and letting / equal 
the domestic firm’s total level of output, we arrive at the following trade levels in 
the domestic market:  
 
(10) !   0)+,)&,0&,  
 
Similarly, we may solve for ! in the foreign market: 
 
(11)  ! 
,) & 0 & -. + 0)+ 
1
.
0 & - . &  ,
 
 
When these values are found to be within  0, 1 , and the price in both 
markets found to be non-negative, we can verify that trade is indeed possible.  
These resulting values are quite useful since they allow us to determine what 
properties these two markets must demonstrate in order for intra-industry trade to 
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exist.2  More importantly, an analysis of !  enables us to generalize the set of 
optimal trade levels by studying its levels when tested against the functional limits 
of the price-elasticity of demand.3  Since ! only characterizes only part of the full 
trade equilibrium which we seek to know, we must also solve for the generalized 
price functions in each of the markets.  In the domestic market, the equilibrium 
price, , is given as: 
 
(12)   )0 & ,) –   
 
And in the foreign market  may be given by: 
 
(13)   )0&,) +  
 
 
2.1 The Necessary Conditions for Arbitrage 
 
Owing to the fact that it is only in imperfectly competitive or separable 
markets that dumping can occur it is only natural to consider the possibility of 
arbitrage opportunities within them.  An arbitrage opportunity arises when there is 
the existence of an instantaneous risk-free profit.  This instantaneous risk-free 
profit arises from a disparity in the pricing of a commodity across markets.  
Generally speaking, the instantaneous risk-free profit that emerges as a result of 
this price disequilibrium exists by purchasing the commodity in the market where 
it is least expensive, and selling it in the more expensive market.  In complete 
markets, where the number of transactions involved is considerable, such 
opportunities are few and far between, and any pricing disparities should be 
erased almost instantaneously owing to the price convergence that results from 
arbitrage.  Establishing the conditions for arbitrage is important for several 
reasons.  However, the most important reason for determining when these 
                                                           
2
 By analyzing the roots and limits of both (8) and (9) we are also able to identify circumstances in 
which two-way trade is not feasible.   
3
 These limits are of little interest to us in the context of identifying the trade equilibrium, as they 
merely illustrate how the trade equilibrium changes as a result of exogenous changes in the 
market.   
XV 
 
opportunities can occur in a market is to establish the set of possible trade 
equilibrium values.  We can do this by assuming that arbitrage opportunities do 
not exit, and as a result, we can impose restrictions on the set of possible point 
elasticities of demand at the trade equilibrium. 
Using a simple analysis of the pricing disparity in the asymmetric cost 
model we are considering, we may define the circumstances in which arbitrage 
opportunities would arise in the market for the commodity, (.  Although we have 
already established the existence of a pricing disparity between the two markets, 
the existence of an arbitrage opportunity necessitates that the price spread 
between these two markets be at least equal to the transportation cost, 1 ⁄ , as 
this is the minimum spread that would ensure zero-economic profit: 
 
(12)  234567  ,)+,)&))+ 8  

 
   
The necessary condition for this relation to hold is found to be  0.5 :
   ; 1, as it is only when the price elasticity of demand is within this set that an 
arbitrage profit can exist.4  It is important to clarify that the aforementioned set is 
unique to the cost of export, which we assume is the same for all participants in 
the market.  Moreover, if we are to assume free access to this export ability by all 
market participants, then the Brander-Krugman [1] conclusion that  <  0.5 may be 
viewed as incomplete, if we were to relax the assumption about symmetric 
markets, to the extent that it does not control for the possibility of arbitrage 
opportunities, which should theoretically not exist.  
 
2.2 Confirming the Existence of the Equilibrium Points 
     
  
To confirm that the values for price and ! function as equilibrium points 
within their respective markets; it is necessary that we must impose several 
reasonable restrictions on the higher-order derivatives of the profit functions for 
                                                           
4
 The lower-bound of this range is the result of the root in the denominator.  As a result, two-way 
trade can only arise where  <  0.5. The inequality above is also generalized to situations in 
which 8  1.  Otherwise, the inequality is 0.5 :  :  +,&,&.   
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each firm.  The first necessary condition that we must consider is the negativity of 
the second-derivatives of each firm’s profit function.  Economically, this 
restriction states that a given profit function is decreasing, and therefore, increases 
in output would come at the expense of a reduced profit-level.  Indeed, this is a 
very reasonable requirement given the duopoly setting that we are considering.  
Of equal importance to establishing the stability of the trade equilibrium is the 
requirement that each of the firm’s profit functions, or cross derivatives be 
negative.5  Economically this restriction requires that the marginal revenue of a 
firm declines if the other increases its output.  When this condition holds across 
the set of production levels for both firms, the prescribed trade equilibrium is a 
unique solution.    
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter characterizes the Brander-Krugman [1] model using a set of 
significantly weaker assumptions than those that were used in the 
characterizations of the original 1983 paper.  Applying a weaker set of restrictions 
on this framework is advantageous for several reasons.  The most prominent of 
these is that by using the less restrictive assumption that the firms in the model are 
not identical, and have different economies of scale, we are able to not only 
generalize the instances in which economic dumping would ever actually be 
realized, but also able characterize the model under a set of more empirically 
testable assumptions.  The constant returns to scale assumption set forth in 
Brander-Krugman [1] is indeed a very strong assumption. 
Finally, our analysis concludes with an examination of the relevant 
comparative-static derivatives, which are explained in-depth in the Appendix.  
This analysis is important economically, as it enables us to better understand the 
rates at which the domestic and foreign markets return to equilibrium in the 
presence of export subsidies.   
                                                           
5
 For the domestic firm, these are defined as: =%=' : 0 and  
=%
=% : 0.  For the foreign firm, these 
derivatives are ='=% : 0 and 
='
=% : 
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Chapter II 
The Brander-Krugman Model as a Repeated Game 
 
 
I. Reviewing Pinto (1986) 
 
 
This chapter presents an economic analysis of the original Brander-
Krugman [1] model in the context of a finite sequential game, and the threat of 
government market regulation.  With the assistance of several simplifying 
assumptions that govern the market environment in both the domestic and foreign 
markets, we will characterize an environment in which the possibility of 
government regulation will incentivize international trade at the expense of the 
government’s domestic firm.  Additionally, we will show that the equilibrium 
strategies in this environment are in fact optimal. 
Despite the parsimony of the Brander and Krugman [1] model, a natural 
question which arises is, how well does it function in a sequential game 
environment?  Because of the nature of international trade, it is important to 
XVIII 
 
consider the functionality of such a model in the context of non-cooperative game 
theory.  Within this context, each firm, or player, is assumed to have two 
strategies available to them, diversify by exporting to the market abroad, or 
assuming an autarky attitude.  Fitting this to a non-cooperative game is ideal for 
reasons stemming from both the oligopolistic nature of the firms in the market, as 
well as the inherent transportation costs involved with international trade.   
One of the first models developed for analyzing reciprocal dumping in this 
context is found in Pinto [5], which considers reciprocal dumping in the context 
of an infinite sequential game.  Although this work presents several interesting 
conclusions, including the existence of an autarkic solution as a robust Nash 
Equilibrium, they are primarily the result of the existence of the transportation 
costs associated with exports, which follows directly from Brander and Krugman 
[1].  However, since this cost exists as a multiplier, 1/, and    0, 1, which is 
a very liberal assumption to say the least, it is indeed very difficult to arrive at any 
definitive conclusions from the model presented in Pinto [5].  Despite these 
shortcomings, Pinto [5] nevertheless makes a strong case for considering 
reciprocal dumping in the context of a sequential game. 
Our analysis of reciprocal dumping in this context builds on the original 
structural model considered by Pinto [5].  However, rather than focus our analysis 
on the general Cournot model considered by both Brander and Krugman [1] and 
Pinto [5], we instead choose to consider a sequential Stackelberg game where the 
government acts as a third party.  While a Stackelberg market has previously not 
been considered within the Brander and Krugman [1] model, it is a worthy 
assumption since it can be easily applied to markets in which there are new 
entrants.  Presumably, these new entrants are able to ‘learn’ about the other firms 
currently in the market, and as a result, have an information advantage that is 
analogous to that of the ‘Follower’ under Stackelberg competition.   
 Although it was our goal to test the robustness of reciprocal dumping 
under Stackelberg competition, the introduction of the government as a third party, 
presents an interesting analysis in and of itself, as we are able to show 
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characterize a form of government regulation that not only improves the results of 
intra-industry trade, but also consumer welfare in each of the exporting economies.   
 
 
 
 
II. The Sequential Game Model 
 
 
The basic market model we will consider is fundamentally identical to that 
of Pinto [5], which considers reciprocal dumping in the context of an infinite 
sequential game.  There are two firms and two countries, domestic and foreign.  
The two firms, which are identical in nature, each of produce a homogenous 
commodity,  .  By virtue of their symmetric nature, both firms are dually 
assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale in production.  The markets in each of 
these two countries are also identical in all aspects.  While the two countries are 
free to trade with one another, there is a per-unit transportation cost, >, associated 
with doing so.  Explicitly, this per-unit transportation cost is defined as: >  1/, 
and functions as a multiplier since  0, 1.  Combining this transportation cost, 
g, with the cost of production, which is assumed to be linear, yields the cost of an 
exported good, which we define as.   
 We assume the demand for the commodity  to be linear and defined by 
the inverse function    ?   @A  with ? < 0 .  Since we may simplify our 
computations without any loss in generalizability, we may extend the without loss 
of generalizability (WLOG) assumption set forth in Pinto by setting @  1. By 
symmetry, these assumptions extend across both markets.  
 As stated, the cost associated with the production of commodity z is 
assumed to be constant.  The cost function for the production of z in autarky is 
therefore defined as (   A, which results in constant returns to scale, as 
marginal cost is a constant, .6  Extending the autarky cost function to the free-
                                                           
6
 We have constant returns to scale (CRS) in this scenario, because we assume that there are no 
fixed costs.   
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trade scenario, we arrive at  (   A   >A , where the marginal cost of an 
exported unit of ( is a constant, >. 
 
2.1   The Sequential Game Assumptions 
 
  
Where Pinto [5] considered an infinite sequential game, we will limit our 
treatment to a finite horizon with three periods.  Additionally, unlike the Cournot 
duopoly model that Pinto considers, in which the home and exporting firms arrive 
at the market simultaneously, we assume that each firm moves first in its home 
market.  This results with the firms engaging in Stackelberg Competition, as they 
set their levels of market output sequentially, with the exporting firm selecting its 
profit-maximizing level of output subject to the quantity that was previously 
announced by the home firm.   
In an additional deviation from the Pinto framework, we assume that the 
domestic firm perceives the exporting firm’s ability to successfully enter the 
market at each period as BC  .25D  1, where D is the current period of the 
game.  Thus, the perceived probabilities of successful entry for each of the three 
periods are, respectively: 0.5, 0.75, and 1.  In creating this assumption, we remove 
Pinto’s assumption of perfect information across the two firms, as the actual 
probability of the exporting firm has the ability to successfully enter the market in 
any given period, BC  1. The final assumption that we consider in our game is 
the threat of government intervention.   
 The final assumption we shall impose is that the countries considered in 
the model are barred from imposing import or export restraints, but are 
nevertheless interested in dissuading imports of .  This assumption is analogous 
to two countries engaged in a free-trade agreement in which such practices (e.g. 
tariffs and quotas) are barred.  Since the governments of each of the countries are 
nevertheless interested in protecting the interests of their domestic manufacturers 
of , but are barred from implementing explicit protectionist practices, they both 
publicly announce that they will execute a trigger strategy on the importing firm 
should it choose to participate in the home market.  This trigger strategy, which 
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takes one period to implement, reverses the information advantage held by the 
foreign firm, requiring it to publicly announce its production quantity before 
arriving to the market.  In other words, under the trigger strategy, the home 
government now requires that the exporting firm announce the quantity of  that 
it will bring to the market, first. This reverses the Stackelberg ‘advantage’ that 
was once held by the foreign firm, as it is transferred over to the domestic firm. 
This assumption is interesting and novel for several reasons.  The first of these 
is that it has not been considered either in the literature or in practice, and thus 
makes for an interesting  
 
 
III.) Deriving the Equilibrium Strategies 
 
 
 The optimal strategy set for each firm is the strategy which maximizes the 
present-value of its expected payoff from the game.  Although it is not integral to 
the results, the symmetry of the firms and markets in each country allows us to 
successfully solve this game by only considering the optimal strategy of the 
domestic firm.  This implies that the sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy profile 
EF , is the same for both firms. Since the set of strategies available to the two 
firm’s changes through time, as a result of both the government’s trigger strategy 
and the domestic firm’s perception of the foreign firm’s export ability, solving 
this game requires us to evaluate the payoffs from each period separately.  To do 
this, we will first consider the expected payoffs from the first period.  
 
 
3.1  The Sequential Game Assumptions 
 
 
 In the first period of the game, the domestic firm has the option of either 
diversifying its business by exporting into the foreign market G, or producing 
only for the domestic market, which we denote as the isolationist strategy, H.  
Since the firm has the option of participating in two markets, we must consider 
the payoffs from participating in each of these markets separately from one 
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another, even though it is assumed that a firm will always produce in its domestic 
market.  
 The first market we will consider is the domestic firm’s home market.  
Knowing that the foreign firm is free to export and sell in this market, the 
domestic firm has two sub-strategies available to it in the domestic market; it can 
either anticipate that the foreign firm will diversify, by producing the Stackelberg 
optimal quantity, which we denote as strategy E, or it can ignore the possibility, 
and produce the monopolist profit-maximizing quantity, denoted as strategy I.  
The Stackelberg and monopolist quantities are given below in (2) and (3), 
respectively: 
 
(2) JK  L&  M+,  
 
 
(3) JN  L+,  
 
 Given these two production alternatives, we next need to consider the 
expected payoffs for each of them. Even though the level of output is notably 
higher under the Stackelberg equilibrium level of output, the effects of the 
elasticity of demand, which is defined in this case to be  A⁄ , as well as the best-
responses of the foreign firm each play a significant role in defining the expected 
payoffs.  Since the domestic firm arrives to the domestic market first, and 
perceives the foreign market’s threat of successfully diversifying into this market 
with {P = 0.5}, the expected payoff for a strategy, O, is given by:  
 
(4)  PEF  BQRSTOD TDUS  1  BDR TDUS 
 
 Using this methodology, we are able to derive the expected values for both 
E and I.  Solving for each of these expected values, we find that the optimal 
isolationist strategy, H, is I; to ignore the export threat by the foreign firm.  
We find that ignoring the export threat of the foreign firm is optimal so long as 
the following relation is satisfied: 
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(5)  V 
  W?>  
X
W >  
X
V >
 < 0 
 
Since two-way trade can only exist where ? > >, this relation holds true over 
the entire set of production possibilities, and therefore, the strategy of ignoring the 
foreign firm’s export threat will always be the dominant strategy, so long as the 
probability of the foreign firm’s threat succeeding is B Y  EZT[[ ; 0.5.7  
The expected payoff from strategy H,  in the first round is therefore found to be: 
 
(6)  P\   XV?
  W?> 
]
V 
  ? 

W > 
 
Now that we have defined the optimal strategy in the domestic market, we 
may next consider the optimal diversification strategy that the domestic firm 
could pursue.  These calculations are simplified by virtue of the fact that the 
Stackelberg advantage rests with the domestic firm in this situation.  The result of 
this is that the foreign firm’s level of output reduces to a constant in the domestic 
firm’s profit equation.  In turn, the domestic firm will select its profit-maximizing 
level of output subject to whether the foreign firm chooses to expect or ignore the 
domestic firm’s exportation threat.  Therefore, the expected value of diversifying 
is the average profit of these two outcomes, plus the optimal production level in 
the domestic market, which we found to be I, and is given as: 
 
(7)  P   XV?
  ^X 
    XV?> 

W > 
_
V? 

X >

 
 
A simple examination of (7) reveals that P < P\.  In fact, so long as 
the domestic firm is able to realize an economic profit when it diversifies, this 
relation will always hold since we assume that the domestic firm will adopt [D] 
when it can realize the home and foreign markets are independent of one another, 
and we assume that the domestic firm is always a producer in the home market.  
We may characterize this relation with the following functional form: 
 
(8) P   P\ + P`a%3b4cd 
                                                           
7
 As a result of this requirement, the equilibrium production strategy in the domestic market during 
the second and third periods is to produce the Stackelberg equilibrium quantity since P(Success) > 
0.5 in each of these periods. 
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Therefore, so long as `a%3b4cd 8 0  , which is the economic profit from 
exporting into the foreign market, P  will always yield a higher expected 
payoff.  Although P < P\, it may not yet be confirmed that the domestic 
firm will elect to export to the foreign market, as we must first evaluate the 
expected payoffs in each of the sequential periods to determine the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium strategy profile.  In other words, in order to determine which 
strategy the domestic firm should adopt in the first period, we must determine 
which strategy generates the highest expected profit over the duration of the game.   
 
 
3.2 The Second and Third Periods  
 
The methods for evaluating the payoffs for each of the strategies in the second 
and third periods is identical to that which was used to evaluate the first period 
payoffs, except that we must now consider the effects of government intervention.  
Since the third player in this game, the domestic government, will only implement 
its trigger strategy if the foreign firm does export into the Home market, it was not 
necessary to consider its role in the first period.  However, now that we are 
evaluating the subsequent periods, we must consider the effect trigger strategy in 
both the Home and Foreign markets.  
As a result of the introduction of these new possibilities, the set of payoffs that 
we must consider in evaluating the expected payoff at each decision node 
increases significantly.  However, a simpler way around this exists due to the fact 
that each sub-game of this model is itself a one-shot game.  This is a convenient 
nuance which arises from the Stackelberg market model that we are considering. 
Therefore, so long as we can show that (ii) above generates a positive payoff, 
( < 0), then we may deduce from the first iteration that diversifying is the 
equilibrium strategy in all subsequent periods.  To test this, we compute the 
spread between the domestic firm’s export payoff after the Stackelberg Advantage 
has been reversed, and the expected export payoff in the prior period.  If this 
spread is non-negative, E < 0, then we have confirmed that diversification is the 
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equilibrium strategy in all subsequent periods, ceteris paribus.   This spread, E, is 
defined as: 
 
(9) E  efL & , + M 
fL – M & ,
g h < 0 
 
This relation will always hold since we assume that partial quantities of 
commodity   are not possible, we can confirm that diversifying will be the 
selected strategy in all subsequent periods of the game. 8   While this is a 
convenient result, the satisfaction of (9) has far greater implications, as it 
demonstrates that the government’s prescribed trigger strategy in this Stackelberg 
market incentivizes the trade that it had sought to dissuade.  This in turn begs the 
question, if the government’s trigger strategy fails to deter imports of , what 
effect does the strategy have on the domestic firm whose interests it sought to 
protect? 
 
3.3 The Effect of Government Intervention on the Domestic Firm 
 
So just how effective is the government in protecting the domestic firm with 
this trigger strategy?  The answer is not at all.  We can demonstrate this by simply 
comparing the domestic profits before and after the trigger strategy was enacted.  
Letting i denote the domestic firm’s profit before the trigger strategy and  j 
equal the firm’s profit after the strategy, we find that the firm’s payoff is actually 
reduced as a result of the government’s intervention: 
 
(10)  i  j  XL
k+ gL,&LM+V ,M&],k
V < 0 
  
The reason for why the domestic firm is hurt as a result of its own 
government’s intervention arises for no other reason than the foreign firm’s 
newfound status as the market leader.  This is a form of commitment power 
                                                           
8
  Although (9) implies that we do not need to value the payoffs during each period of the game, 
the precise calculations for each of the individual payoffs, which are derived through basic 
calculus, are provided in the Appendix.  These calculations confirm the diversification strategy 
(D) suggested by (8).   
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because the foreign firm is unable to adjust its level of output following its 
announcement.  This results with the foreign firm selecting its profit-maximizing 
level of output where the price elasticity of demand is most inelastic.  Because of 
this, the domestic firm is forced to select its payoff-maximizing quantity in the 
relatively more elastic regions of the market, which results in it selecting a lower 
quantity of output than it did when it was the market leader.  Unfortunately, even 
though the market price for  will be higher after government intervention, it will 
not be sufficiently high enough to offset the revenue lost from the reduction in 
output.   
 
   
IV.) The Nash Equilibrium: An Optimal Strategy Profile  
 
 
Having established in (9) that diversifying (D) always results in a higher 
expected payoff with government intervention than without, and having 
established that diversifying (D) in the first period yields the highest payoff, we 
have shown that the best strategy profile available to the domestic firm is to 
diversify in every period: E  lG, G, Gm .  By symmetry, we can dually 
conclude that this is also the best strategy profile available to the foreign firm as 
well: E  lG, G, Gm.  Since these are the best strategy profiles available to 
either firm, we can conclude that these profiles comprise the game’s subgame 
perfect equilibrium.  In other words, the Nash Equilibrium at each point in this 
super-game is to export into the other firm’s home market (D).  We may formally 
define this equilibrium point as: 
 
 (10) E ,   EG, G, G, G, G, G  
 
Although the equilibrium strategies in the first period are suboptimal, the 
subgame perfect equilibrium has the double identity of also being the optimal 
strategy set of the game.  How this peculiarity arises is the sole result of the 
trigger strategies implemented by the home and foreign governments.  As 
conveyed by (9), the governments’ trigger strategy, by no mere coincidence, 
incentivizes imports by offering exporters a higher level of profit than in either 
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autarky or the unregulated market.  Because of this, firms have an incentive to 
initiate the trigger strategy of their export market’s government at the first 
possible opportunity, which is the first period of the game, as it is this strategy 
that opens the door to the highest potential profits.   In addition, it is worth noting 
that despite the adverse effects that the government’s intervention produces for its 
domestic firm in the partial equilibrium setting, the coordination failure between 
these two countries and firms actually results in a general equilibrium that makes 
both firms and both countries substantially better off.   Furthermore, since it can 
be shown that this result holds true in both Cournot and autarkic markets, a more 
thorough analysis of this form of cooperative information coordination, by 
governments, can and should be completed.  This is especially true in the context 
of international trade agreements, as it is readily apparent that there are significant 
welfare gains to be realized from this cooperative approach. 
 
 
V.) Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Using a finite sequential game, this chapter develops considers a special case 
of reciprocal dumping, in which a protectionist practice enacted by governments 
has the effect of reducing the welfare of the domestic industry it sought to protect.  
This is augmented by the fact that the government’s trigger strategy of regulating 
the market goes into permanent effect once it observes the arrival of a foreign 
firm in the country’s market, the trigger.  There is no question that this is a bold 
assumption, as it naturally raises the question, why would the government 
continue to regulate a market when domestic producers incur a loss in profit as a 
result? 
 
Despite the seemingly pointless nature of this government intervention, there 
are two circumstances in which the continued regulation of this market could 
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prove to be efficient.9  The simplest of these instances occurs when the cost of 
developing trade policy and any other legislation, or for that matter, reversing 
trade policy and other legislation, exceeds the losses incurred by the domestic 
firm.  This is an entirely possible scenario, and one which can be efficiently 
resolved by requiring that the government compensate the domestic firm for its 
losses.  The second instance in which the prolonged execution of this trade policy 
is efficient arises exists when the improvements to the country’s welfare, on the 
whole, exceed the losses of the firm.  Unfortunately, this cannot occur given our 
assumption of a Stackelberg market, but could however be readily applied when 
the unregulated market is a Cournot duopoly.10  This situation could feasibly arise 
under this market structure owing to the fact that the consumer surplus of the 
domestic consumers is considerably higher after government intervention than in 
the unregulated Cournot market.    
 
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion reached during the course of this 
analysis has been the subgame perfect equilibrium’s dual personality as the 
optimal strategy profile of the game.  While this is intriguing for a host of reasons, 
the fact that this arises as a product of the governments’ use of permanent trigger 
strategies features most prominently.  This is of interest because the trigger 
strategies, despite being dominated strategies, when jointly executed have a 
certain synergy that significantly enhances the profits for both firms in the model.  
However, because the trigger strategy is itself dominated, the equilibrium we find 
in this game is unlikely to emerge in a sequential environment where the trigger 
strategy may be reversed.  This is admittedly unfortunate, as we find that when 
the requirement by both governments that exporting firms announce their export 
quantities in advance, the profits of two-way trade are substantially higher than  in 
any other possible market structure.  
 
                                                           
9
 We define efficiency through a Kaldor Criterion, which asks us to simply consider whether a  
Pareto optimal outcome can be reached if those that gain under the prolonged existence of the 
government’s intervention could compensate the parties which are harmed, and still be better off. 
10
 It is worth noting that if we were to remodel this game substituting our Stackelberg market with 
a Cournot, we would still arrive at the same subgame perfect equilibrium.   
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Conclusion 
 
We have aptly characterized the optimal strategies of firms engaged in 
two-way trade, in two unique settings.  In Chapter 2, where we analyze the static 
case of a duopoly facing an asymmetric cost structure that is engaged in two-way 
intra-industry trade.  Through our analysis of this instance, we show that the 
asymmetric nature of the firms involved gives rise to dumping, with the firm with 
the lowest economies of scale dumping in its export market.  Additionally, we 
also consider in our analysis the existence of arbitrage opportunities in instances 
where dumping is prevalent.  Although we rely on several assumptions to 
generalize these instances in assuming that there are minimal fixed costs 
associated with arbitrage, the existence and effect of these opportunities is worthy 
of a further analysis.  This is but one of several possible extensions that may be 
made to the framework we present in Chapter 1, though none should feature more 
prominently than an analysis of the income distribution effects from such trade.  
Although time constraints prevented us from being able to analyze these effects, 
such an analysis is integral to determining whether or not two-way trade is in fact 
beneficial to both economies. 
In Chapter 3, we develop and characterize the optimal strategy profile of 
two firms engaged in intra-industry trade in a repeated game environment.  
Without question, the most significant results emanating from this Chapter is our 
conclusion that trade regulation through export coordination between countries 
engaged in intra-industry trade offers substantial improvements in profitability 
throughout the industry.  At the same time, because the market price in both 
markets decreases as a result of government intervention there is a corresponding 
increase in consumer welfare.  While this result is indeed significant, the 
possibility that this coordination could have an adverse effect on the overall 
welfare of both countries is within the realm of possibilities.  For instance, even 
though consumer surplus is greatly improved when coordination is enacted under 
both autarky and Cournot duopoly settings, this proves not to be the case of the 
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Stackelberg market that we originally considered in our sequential game.  As a 
result, our analysis presented in Chapter 2 is still incomplete, since our ability to 
thoroughly generalize the circumstances in which export coordination is an 
optimal strategy, hinges on our understanding of the income distribution effect it 
has on an unregulated Stackelberg environment.  Nevertheless, we are able to 
identify at least two common market environments in which governments’ 
coordination of industry information can improve the welfare of not only the 
industry itself but the country, entire. 
In conclusion, this paper characterizes two unique scenarios in which 
intra-industry trade can give rise to dumping.  The noted differences between 
these two scenarios have enabled us to better analyze the limitations and 
generalizations that are made with the Brander-Krugman [1] model in both static 
and sequential settings. However, this is by no means the most significant 
contribution this paper makes to the literature.  Rather, our demonstration of the 
effects of government coordination of inputs has a wide range of applications on 
the policy-making level, as the welfare of countries who agree to adopt this form 
of regulation is significantly improved.  An obvious extension of the results from 
the characterizations we present in this compilation that can and should be made 
is an analysis of the income distribution and welfare effects that emanate from 
each of these characterized environments.   
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
A Simple Trade Equilibrium Example Assuming Asymmetric Costs: 
Assumptions:  
(1) The Demand function is linear, and is defined as: A7  20   
(2) The transaction cost multiplier, >, is 1.1, which implies:   0.9 
(3) The foreign firm’s marginal cost is   3 
The total revenue functions for the domestic and foreign firm are respectively 
given as:   
    o20    p  20           ⁄    
 
 
    20      20          ⁄    
 
Taking first derivatives of the total revenue functions, we arrive at the following 
marginal revenue functions: 
 
   q20  q2  qq  20  q2   q   4q  4 q   1.1  0 
 
  
   20     2   20    2     1.1  0 
 
With a little rearranging, this system can be brought into the matrix notation, 
sY  t .  This gives a 4x4 matrix, which encompasses the marginal revenue 
functions of both markets Using Cramer’s rule, we arrive at the following 
equilibrium levels of output:  
 
 A    0.6316 
 A    1.7316 
 A    7.0842 
 A    8.1842 
The equilibrium price is: B    11.1842. The law of one price is maintained.   
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Deriving the Marginal Revenue functions: 
In chapter 2, we derive the marginal revenue functions using a method to simplify 
our calculations, by expressing marginal revenue in terms of   and ! .  This 
section illustrates how this substitution was made: 
Beginning with the original total revenue function, and letting y be foreign output, 
we have: 
      
Because of our symmetry assumption, we need only consider a single market. By 
the product rule, and letting (  represent total output, we arrive at the following 
marginal revenue function: 
 x  (     73y7y  
Since this is not a particularly easy function to generate reduced form equations 
with, we multiply the right hand side by (z/z): 
            x  (1  yy 
%
3y 
73y
7y  
With a little inspection, it is clear that this equation contains the inverse of the 
point elasticity of demand (z/p)*(dp(z)/d(z)): 
 x  (1  %y 
y
3y 
73y
7y  
Rearranging, we get: 
 x  (1  %y 

) 
Because (x/z) represents the market share of the domestic firm, we can use the 
complement to represent the foreign market share, (1- (x/z), but first, we must 
remove the inverse of the elasticity of demand.  This gives: 
 x  (  1   ! 
This is identical to the total revenue function for each firm in its home market. 
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Comparative Static Analysis (An Export Subsidy Application): 
To generate our comparative-statics for the market equilibrium, we will have 
to first consider the simultaneous system of equations that make up each of the 
two markets.  Each of these systems is defined by the functions that define the 
profits of each the duopolists in the specified market.  Solving this system for our 
variable of interest, !, necessitates satisfying the sufficiency conditions of the 
Implicit Function Theorem, which we will aptly demonstrate by showing that the 
Jacobian determinant,|{|, of all our comparative-static systems are non-zero.    
 
The first comparative-static derivatives that we shall consider involve the 
change in ! with respect to changes in export production.  There is significant 
merit in analyzing this comparative-static due to its numerous applications to 
matters of international trade policy.  One particular extension that readily comes 
to mind is the case of governmental export subsidies.  For instance, suppose the 
domestic government were to begin to subsidize the domestic firm’s export 
business as part of a larger policy to improve its presence in international markets.  
This subsidy, which for the sake of simplicity is assumed to be in any form other 
than an ad-valorem subsidy, will, so we assume, successfully incentivize the 
domestic firm to increase its level of export production.  Given the possibility of 
such a program, especially in light of programs such as the United States’ Export 
Enhancement Program (EEP), it is naturally advantageous for the foreign firm to 
analyze how the relevant market will adjust, ceteris paribus, given the domestic 
firm’s increased level of exports.  It is with comparative-static analysis that this 
can easily be achieved.  For simplicity, and without loss of generalizability, we 
use the comparative static of !  to analyze the effect of the domestic 
government’s implementation of an export subsidy. The relevant comparative 
static derivatives under this scenario for the domestic and foreign markets are 
respectively as follows:  
 
 
=%
=' 
3%,
+3%,+)%k,+g)%',+)'k,  : 0    
|}~  0         
 
 
 
=*
=%  
g%k& , & %)& 1.  +g%
0 & , & k < 0 
 
The respective signs on each of the comparative-static derivatives confirm the 
stability of each of the trade equilibriums.  They also provide us insights into how 
the model returns to an equilibrium following an exogenous increase in exports, 
ceteris paribus.  Economically speaking, this enables us to able to better 
understand the rate at which the domestic firm must readjust its domestic output 
in order to return the market to equilibrium, given this exogenous increase in 
exports.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
An Analysis of Equations (4) and (5): 
Equation 4: 
 PEF  BQRSTOD TDUS  1  BDR TDUS 
This defines a firm’s expected profit in its home market for a given strategy. 
Equation 4 is the expected average of two possible outcomes for a given strategy.  
These two outcomes are: 
(1) The other firm is successfully able to enter its rival’s home market 
(2) The other firm is unable to enter its rival’s home market 
This is a weighted average because a firm perceives that the other firm will 
successfully enter its home market with BC  .25D  1, where n denotes the 
number of periods.  The optimal strategy for a firm is to choose the strategy that 
maximizes its expected profit.   
 
Equation 5: 
1
16 
  18?>  
3
8 >  
3
16 >
 < 0 
This defines the profit spread of a firm behaving as a monopolist versus a 
Stackelberg Leader in its home market in the first period.  In expected profit 
notation, and using the subscripts M and S to denote the monopolist and 
Stackelberg leader profits, respectively, this can be expressed as:  
PN   PK < 0 
The intuition behind this equation is that if a firm’s expected profit from behaving 
as a monopolist, exceeds the expected profit from behaving as a Stackelberg 
leader, then the firm should produce the monopolist quantity of output.  However, 
because the firm perceives that the other firm will successfully enter its home 
market with BC  .25D  1, the producing the monopolist quantity of output 
is only optimal in the first period after the game.   
  
Solutions to the Sequential Game Tree 
XXXVIII 
1.1 
1.2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3 
3.3 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.3 
3.1 Period 1 (Optimal Strategy at Home is to Produce Monopolist Quantity): 
1.1 (Diversifying):  
   XV?
  _V? 
^
X 
  XV?> 

W > 

X >

 
 
1.2 (Isolated): 
  316?
  516 
  12? 
1
8?> 
1
8 > 
Period 2 (Optimal Strategy at Home is to Produce Stackelberg Quantity): 
2.1 (Diversifying in both periods): 
   ^W?
  g?
  XV?> 
^
W 
  XXVg >
  ^X > 
2.2 (Diversifying only in period 2): 
   ]]W?
  XV? 
_
Vg >
  XW 
  ^X > 
 
2.3 (Isolated in Period 2): 
   XW?
  XV?> 

? 
^
X > 
gX
W 
  Vg >

 
Period 3 (Optimal Strategy at Home is to Produce Stackelberg Quantity): 
3.1(Diversifying and diversifying prior to period 3): 
  71128 ?
  14? 
9
16?> 
27
128 
  4564 >
  2132 > 
3.2 (Diversifying only in period 3): 
   V?> 
X
Vg >
  ]X > 
X
W?
  ? 
gX
W 

 
3.3 (Isolated in period 3): 
   XW?
  ^V?> 

? 

X > 
gX
W 
  XVg >

 
